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In September 1986,  at a meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, a new
round of multilateral trade  negotiations began.  Agriculture was  identified
as  one  of the key sectors of concern in these negotiations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT).  This paper seeks  to  explain
the need for negotiations in the agricultural sector, and identifies  the
key issues  and positions before the negotiators.  Prospects for  the  outcome
of  the negotiation are also examined.
Agriculture in the GATT
The GATT was established in 1947 by 23  countries agreeing to  subscribe
to  a set of rules  for international trade.  At the  same time,  it
established a forum for the discussion and resolution of trade problems,
and for periodic multilateral negotiations  to  liberalize trade.  Today,  the
GATT has  96  members (several of whom have only recently joined) and its
rules are applied on a de  facto basis by an additional 31  countries.
GATT rules are  supposed to apply to  trade in all goods,
agricultural and industrial.  Its basic premise  is equal  treatment for
national  and imported goods,  and non-discriminatory  treatment among
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the goods of other GATT members.  To  foster a more open trading
system, the use of  quantitative restrictions (such as quotas) on
imports or exports  is  generally prohibited in favour of  stable or
"bound" tariffs.  Subsidies on exports are also  largely prohibited,
and rules are provided for the application of duties to countervail
subsidized or dumped imports, as well as for emergency actions against
harmful imports.  Seven previous rounds  of multilateral trade
negotiations have been held, successfully resulting  in widespread
tariff reductions,  and more recently in codes of  conduct for
non-tariff measures.
In the agricultural sector, a number of exceptions to  the general
GATT rules exist, largely reflecting the  interests of the United
States at the time the GATT was established.  Difficulties  in the
interpretation or enforcement of  these rules have allowed agricultural
trade to  remain largely outside the disciplines  of GATT.  With regard
to import  access, for example, the GATT permits  the use of quotas and
other quantitative restrictions on agricultural imports  in  some cases
when there are government programs seeking to reduce domestic
production of the product.  Export restrictions are permitted in case
of critical domestic shortages.  The rules governing these exceptions
are relatively clear and  strict, but have been largely  ignored by
countries maintaining quotas once justified for other reasons.
Furthermore, some nations (notably the United States  and Switzerland)
have waivers excepting them in  large measure from the  rules on import
access.  Many of  the non-tariff import measures now in  common usage,- 3-
such as variable  levies, minimum import  prices and "voluntary"  export
restraint agreements, did not exist at the  time the GATT was  drafted.
Whether these  "grey area" measures  are consistent with the
requirements of the GATT has never been fully resolved.  Exceptions to
GATT rules are also allowed for actions  to protect human, animal or
plant health, or  to conserve natural resources.  There are virtually
no rules disciplining the use of  such measures, which can operate as
barriers to  trade.
In addition, in contrast to  industrial products, GATT permits the
use of export  subsidies on primary products,  including  semi-processed
agricultural products.  The vaguely defined  limitation on agricultural
subsidies allowing respect for "equitable market shares"  has made any
disciplines difficult  to  apply.  The situation is  now exacerbated by
structural surpluses,  third world debt problems and new production
technologies.
The resulting trade distortions are well known.  Tariffs have
been  replaced by non-tariff barriers to agricultural imports.
Domestic support  levels are  increasingly out of  line with market
signals.  World markets have been depressed by subsidized exports
(often from high cost producers).  Despite GATT success over the years
in reducing tariffs,  in bringing order to trade in  industrial
products, and  in providing a forum for the discussion and resolution
of most trade issues,  much of agricultural trade has  effectively
avoided  its disciplines.- 4 -
In 1982,  a deteriorating world agricultural trade situation led
the GATT contracting parties  to establish a Committee on Trade  in
Agriculture.  Its  mandate was  to  examine how to bring the  sector under
more "operationally effective" GATT rules and disciplines.  Its work
made clear the need to  address all measures which directly or
indirectly affect  agricultural trade  including restrictions maintained
through waivers, variable levies,  direct export  subsidies and other
subsidies which affect agricultural trade.  This  focus was  largely
reflected in the Punta del Este declaration setting forth the
objectives  for the multilateral trade negotiations  (MTN) in
agriculture.
The Negotiating Group  on Agriculture has  primary responsibility
for the sector in the Uruguay Round.  The work of some of the other
negotiating groups,  including the Negotiating Groups on Subsidies,
Tariffs, Non-Tariff Measures, Natural Resource-Based Products, Tropical
Products, Dispute Settlement and on the Functioning of the  GATT,  may
also be of relevance.  Agreements reached in these other areas may
apply to  the agricultural sector and possible trade-offs may be made
between sectors.  Countries  that have limited bargaining power in the
agricultural sector may seek to  exert leverage from other sectors.
As  of August  1988,  the Negotiating Group on Agriculture has held
nine formal meetings, and a few informal  ones.  Specific negotiating
proposals were made before the end of 1987 by all the major agricul-
tural trading countriesl, and have been subsequently discussed.  A- 5 -
technical working group has been established with regard to aggregate
measurements of support.  Another working group on sanitary and
phytosanitary restrictions on trade may be created later this year.
Progress  in the agricultural negotiations will be a major focus  of the
Ministerial Mid-Term Review scheduled for early December  1988  in
Montreal.
Key Issues
Five key  issues will dominate the discussions in Montreal and
beyond:  (1) short-term or emergency actions and their link,  if any,
to a long-term agreement;  (2) identifying existing policies  to  be
reduced or eliminated;  (3) the  linkages between agricultural policy
and broader social welfare objectives, notably food security,
environmental quality and employment policy;  (4) the appropriate role
of LDCs  in agricultural negotiations, with specific reference their
special and differential treatment;  and (5) the role of health and
sanitary regulations as non-tariff trade barriers.
1.  Short-term action
The most difficult immediate obstacle facing the negotiators is
whether and how to implement some form of short-term or emergency
action to alleviate current subsidy and  supply pressures.  All
proposals except that of the United States contain some short-term
element.  Most propose an  immediate freeze and reduction in export
subsidies.  As  a first  installment on agreed long-term actions they
propose action on  domestic subsidies and import  access.  The European
Community (EC) insists that emergency action be a precondition  for- 6 -
agreement on the long-term framework.  The United States,  in direct
contrast,  insists that agreement on a long-term framework should
precede emergency action.
The EC proposes an emergency one-year commitment  on cereal
prices, the reduction of sugar exports and the maintenance of present
access to traditional import markets for sugar, and compliance of all
GATT members with the  International Dairy Arrangement minimum export
prices.  These are differentiated from EC proposed short-term measures
in  the form of commitments to reduce support  (compared to a specified
reference period) and  to bring production under control  in principal
agricultural sectors.  The EC  insists that such action, not
necessarily directly related to any eventual  long-term framework,
should be  accomplished before negotiation over new rules is  begun.
The Cairns Group has called for short-term action  as a "downpayment"
on a longer-term framework and  is seeking to  mediate the diametrically
opposed US and EC  positions.  All participants agree that the final
objective of  the negotiations  is a new set of effective GATT rules
disciplining agricultural trade.
2.  A framework for policies to be reduced or eliminated
In  line with the Punta del Este mandate, all of the major propo-
sals address the need to eliminate or reduce domestic support
measures, export  subsidies and import barriers.  There is a wide
difference of opinion  as to what type of agricultural support should
be reduced or eliminated.  The US proposes  complete elimination of all
except "decoupled" income support and bona fide food aid.  The EC- 7 -
proposes limitations on the quantities  eligible for government
support,  largely through production quotas.  The Japanese propose to
minimize only the trade-distorting effects of domestic policies,
emphasizing their broader social welfare objectives.
How might a framework for domestic support policies to be reduced
or eliminated be characterized?  The complex relationship between
domestic  supports and  trade distortion suggests two essentially
different criteria.  The first is  the degree of trade distortion
resulting from a given policy, or trade effect.  The second, with  its
emphasis on the output or supply-response distortion resulting  from a
given policy, is the "decoupling" concept, or output effect.  Trade
distortion often stems from output distortion, so  the effects, while
different, are related.  (See Figure 1.)
National policies might be said to have zero trade effects  if
they impose no distortions affecting the internal market for a
commodity.  In the absence of such distortion, the participants in  the
internal market face the same basic  conditions as  if  the country had
no border.  This definition encompasses not only policies  that affect
the difference between domestic and external prices, but other
barriers, such as protective health or sanitary regulations, that do
not  affect prices but systematically alter the conditions affecting
the internal  and external market.  National policies may create
incentives  that either encourage or discourage exports or imports  of
particular  commodities.- 8 -
In the context of  the objective of eliminating distortions  to
trade arising from government policies,  a goal should be  to reduce
government measures that operate  to provide major positive or negative
trade incentives, moving towards more trade-neutral policies.
In contrast to the trade effect, the output  effect arises when
national policies create incentives encouraging or  discouraging
production.  Output distorting policies may have negative effects,
such as  United States  and European "set-asides", that pay producers to
reduce their output, or  positive effects, such as price guarantees for
specific grains, that pay producers  to increase their output.  The US,
EC and many other countries  currently engage in  both policies simulta-
neously, pushing on the price support accelerator at the same time as
the set-aside brake, and paying for both.  Movements in the direction
of decoupling are movements toward more output neutral policies.
"Decoupled" agricultural policies are defined as  measures that, in
principle, provide neither positive nor negative incentives to produce
a given crop.  Decoupled payments could be provided through direct
income payments, a positive/negative tax scheme, a minimum income
insurance program or some other variation.  So  long as  freedom exists
for farmers to grow whatever crops are most marketable, the program
would be more decoupled from planting decisions than currently.  In
the absence of artificial stimulation to produce or not to produce,
farmers make more planting and marketing decisions on the basis of
market prices.  Decoupling thus relates  specifically to output effects
of various agricultural policies, and the supply-response distortions- 9 -
that result.  Still,  it cannot be held that these payments will have
zero effects on production, since the  income  could be  invested in
additional  output.  Naturally, the lower the payment, the  less  the
incentive.  Decoupling  is  thus best described as  a matter of degree,
with some policies having fewer output effects  than others.
In a GATT context, a series of  limits on acceptable policy could
be set with respect to both trade  and output effects, with all
agricultural policies constrained to  fall within certain arbitrary
bounds over a period of ten years.  The purpose of the bounds would be
to move away from both positive and negative trade and output
distortions, toward more  trade and output neutrality.  These bounds
may, of course, be biased toward either positive or negative production
or trade  incentives, depending on the negotiated agreements.
Trade and output distortions are two important,  and separable,
components  of the negotiating framework in agriculture.  Progress  in
the negotiations may be defined by an agreement to move,  in each
country, toward policies that are liberalizing overall,  in the  sense
that both output and trade distortions are reduced, or alternatively,
by movement  towards a package  of policies with net liberalizing
effects.  Each country may choose a different mix of such policies, but
all would be bound by a common framework agreement.  Focusing attention
on output distortions adds a domestic agricultural policy dimension to
the traditional GATT objective of reducing distortions to  trade,
consistent with the Punta del Este Declaration's resolve  to  confront
the domestic sources of agricultural  trade protection.- 10  -
Another related theme common  to many of  the negotiating proposals
is the need for some measurement device to reflect the  total level of
diverse government support measures.  Most frequently proposed is  some
form of the  Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) recently calculated by
the OECD.  Variations include the Trade Distortion Equivalent  (TDE)
proposed by Canada and the Support Measurement Unit  (SMU) proposed  by
the EC.  The PSE measures the amount of  income that must be given or
taken away so as  to  compensate producers  for a change  in policy.  This
subsidy equivalent  is a measure of the  level of domestic  support
provided to producers,  but is not a direct measure of either the
output or trade effects of policy.  It  is,  rather,  an independent
"check" on  the overall  level  of  subsidy flowing  to agricultural
producers and may be useful  in monitoring support levels.  The TDE
amends the PSE by attempting to  isolate only those  subsidies that have
trade effects, then adjusts  the PSE calculation in an attempt to
capture the trade distorting component of  the producer's subsidy.  The
SMU uses a fixed reference price to minimize the effects  of exchange
rate fluctuations.  Some countries, particularly Japan and some LDCs,
oppose the use of  such devices, primarily because  they fail to take
into account the non-economic objectives of many agricultural
policies.
3.  Non-trade Social Welfare Obiectives
Various proposals have emphasized objectives of agricultural
policy that are outside the realm of trade or  output effects.  The
European Communities,  the Nordics, and Japan,  in particular, have- 11  -
repeatedly emphasized that agricultural policies have extra-market
social objectives.  Perhaps  the most important of these are food
security, environmental quality  and rural employment.  These
objectives underlie much of the resistance  to policy reform and are
often treated as minor issues by advocates  of liberalization.
However, these objectives relate directly to  the capacity of
governments to "sell" agricultural and trade policy reforms, and may
be  crucial to a final package of domestic and trade policy changes.
One manner  of addressing some of these concerns  is  to move away
from production-oriented support measures towards more output-neutral
(decoupled) direct payments to farmers.  A key problem is that direct
payments are often seen as  "welfare for farmers".  However,  it can be
argued that  current payment  schemes, notably payments per acre  in the
United States and European Communities, are less equitable than
welfare in the  sense that the largest farmers receive the largest
payments.  Welfare objectives may be made more acceptable if  obliga-
tions accompany the receipt of  direct payments.  One politically
attractive option with sound economic justifications  is  to link direct
income supports to a program of environmental improvements,  including
retirement of environmentally sensitive lands.  By taking carefully
targeted fragile lands out of  production, the primary effect would not
be supply control, but a shift  in cultivation patterns onto those
lands most able to support sustainable productivity gains over time.
Retirement of fragile  lands would also substantially reduce erosion
and pollution, and offset the costs of direct  income transfers.-12  -
It  can be argued that direct  income transfers,  coupled with
environmental projects  (river and stream improvements, erosion
reduction, forest plantings) could generate employment in the rural
sector.  In  contrast, some economists believe  the high price supports
of the United States  and European Communities have primarily benefited
large producers using heavy concentrations  of  chemical  inputs,
contributing  to  soil and water pollution and the decline of small,
diversified, labor-intensive producers.
Food security, perhaps  the most difficult social  concern, arises
particularly  in discussions with the Japanese and with net  importing
developing countries.  Food security is  an  important psychological
dimension of agricultural policy in countries where the memory of
privations  is  only a generation old, and  in those with very limited
foreign reserves.  Unfortunately, there has tended to be confusion
between food security (which, assuming reliable suppliers and
sufficient income, can be accomplished through trade) and the more
autarchic  idea of self-sufficiency, which can be used to justify a
high level of protection.  In the domain of food security, greater
assurance against supply interruptions  can be achieved through binding
GATT obligations, but  financial constraints must be  addressed
elsewhere.
4.  LDCs:  Special  and Differential Treatment
Special and differential treatment (S&D) for LDCs  is now an
integral  aspect of the rights and obligations  defined in the GATT.
Based on  agreements made  in  1964 to exempt LDCs  from reciprocal- 13 -
concessions under "Part IV"  of the GATT Agreement, and  subsequent
waivers  from Most-Favored-Nation treatment, the Tokyo Round
legitimized S&D in  1979  through an "enabling clause" that created a
"tiered"  system of rights and obligations (Aho and Aronson,
pp. 95-115).  These agreements have allowed LDCs the rights  of  GATT
membership, without corresponding obligations.  While considerable
criticism has been  leveled within the trade policy establishment at
S&D,  their legitimacy was  stressed again in  the Punta del Este
declaration.  Efforts to provide S&D treatment  in past negotiations
have usually taken the form of non-reciprocity in the value of
concessions exchanged between developed and developing nations,  and
longer  implementation periods for  the developing  countries.
In the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, a group of developing
countries  (particularly the net  food importers)  insist that  special
and differential treatment be an  integral part of any agreed long-term
framework of rules.  No specific suggestions on how this could best be
accomplished have yet been presented, but major concerns  include the
reduction or elimination of export subsidies without  increasing  import
costs  for importing LDCs;  the maintainance of LDC  support measures
related to  the non-economic objectives  of agricultural policies
including employment, structural adjustment, development and  food
security;  and the protection of  LDC domestic markets for development
purposes.
In the context of proposals to reduce the trade and output
effects of government policies, there is  some scope for S&D.  In most- 14  -
LDCs,  internal agricultural price policies discriminate against
producers and artificially depress  output.  The removal of these
policies  (without any additional subsidy) would be a move  in  the
direction of more output-neutral (decoupled) policy.  Furthermore,
many LDCs  impose border measures that are significant distortions to
trade.  Export taxes, for example,  if removed, would constitute a move
away from negative trade incentives.  Even if domestic  subsidies were
left unchanged, removal  of  such trade distortions would constitute a
net improvement and a concession  in GATT terms.
5.  Health and Sanitary Regulations
Following the mandate of the Punta del Este Declaration, each of
the proposals makes  reference to the need to  improve disciplines on
health and sanitary  ("H&S")  restrictions which act as  barriers  to
trade.  Previous efforts  to address this thorny problem have been
largely unsuccessful.  Improvements in notification and consultation
procedures,  and perhaps  in dispute settlement procedures, are
possible, but  past experience shows  little benefit from such efforts.
A number of  the proposals refer to the use of universally accepted
standards,  and to  the work done in  other  international bodies  such as
the FAO's Codex Alimentarius.  Difficulty arises here because there do
not exist agreed international standards regarding health and sanitary
restrictions for more than a few items,  and none are binding.
Direction of the Negotiations
Heading into  the final two years of the Uruguay Round,
negotiators confront both political and practical challenges  in- 15  -
agriculture.  An important question is  the capacity and  interest of
the new US administration (regardless of party) to maintain the
momentum of the first two years  and to push as  adamantly for reform,
especially if  drought  leads to short supplies  and rising prices.  Also
at issue  is  the capacity of the EC to make substantial reforms
following the bitter battle for  its recent stabilizer programs, and of
Japan to offer  further liberalization  in the wake of those  recently
forced upon it by dispute settlements, which have aroused  intense
domestic opposition.
The interaction of multilateral trade negotiations and domestic
policies  can lead to mutually reinforcing reforms.  But a movement
toward less  liberal trade and greater protectionism is  also possible
if progress  in Geneva appears  stalled (Paarlberg).  In  the context of
the December meeting in Montreal, the European and United States
positions seem to be on a collision course.  The European position
stems from the recent budget stabilizers package which, while
attempting  to limit production, reinforces the two-price system of  the
CAP and augments  the budget, allowing for greater export subsidization
should a subsidy war erupt.  As  for  the United States  position, its
strength - uncompromising support for  liberalization - is  also  its
weakness;  it  is  considered completely unrealistic by many.
Incentives exist for either the advocates of liberalization (the
United States) or  the advocates of "realism"  (the European Community)
to walk out of the negotiation, each justifying their action as
defending the true objectives of GATT.- 16  -
In any event,  the Uruguay Round appears  sure to  affect the  1990
US Farm Bill debate.  Proposals to establish "marketing loans  across
the board",  for example, together with re-entry of much of the land
taken out of production under  the  1985 Farm Bill, have been suggested
as a way to "punish"  intractable European  interests.  While removing
acreage from set-asides  could improve the United States  competitive
position considerably (especially if  a targeting scheme were adopted
allowing  low cost and non-erosion-prone acres to be re-entered first),
the marketing loan amounts to  an export restitution, and would place
the United States on  a par with the EC as a subsidizer of  exports.  If
the United States  intends to stay with  its current approach, re-
entering competitive acres is  consistent with greater output
neutrality.  However, marketing loans  distort trade since they
insulate the producer from the market and decrease the  interaction
between domestic and international prices.
In summary, there are certain areas of universal concern  in which
discussion and potential progress  is  likely.  First, some resolution
of short versus long-run reforms must be made.  Second,  it  appears
that movement towards  less  trade- and output-distorting policies will
remain a core concept.  The  trade effects of policies must be ranked
according to their  relative distorting effects, allowing acceptable
bounds to be established as  a basis  for further negotiation.  In order
to make output effects  (and thus decoupling) operational from a
negotiating perspective, they must be clarified and related to
particular policies, so that a given policy is understood as more or- 17  -
less "decoupled" than another.  Similar  bounds should then be
established to  limit policies with extremely negative or extremely
positive output distorting  effects.
Third, social welfare objectives of  agricultural policies will
inevitably be  a part  of the discussion.  These issues may appear
tangential to trade or output effects, but are crucial  in selling
policy reforms to domestic public interests.  All negotiators must be
able to  justify to their constituents  (commodity and consumer  groups)
that they have gotten a "fair deal"  in GATT.  If,  for example,  this
deal involves  decoupling, then decoupling must be acceptable to the
farm and non-farm public alike.  Linking  it to  environmental policy
reforms may help its acceptance through the  impact  on rural develop-
ment and employment objectives.  Nor  can the  issue  of  food security be
sidestepped;  it will be important  to guarantee supplies to major
importers as  part of  a final agreement, consistent with the rules of
GATT.
Fourth, the issue of LDC treatment is  likely to remain.  It is
possible that offers of access and, if  necessary, special and
differential treatment will be made.  But there are risks  in this
approach.  If  the LDCs are exempted from GATT disciplines agreed to by
the United States, the European Communities and Japan, these major
players could possibly move outside of  GATT to conduct agricultural
negotiations, closing off LDC market access.  GATT must also remain
sensitive to the IMF and World Bank attempts to have LDCs discipline
their own pricing policies.  A real opportunity exists to bring LDCs- 18  -
into the same output and trade  framework as the developed countries.
The role of GATT  in  removing LDC market distortions that
decrease output through subsidies to consumers, and reducing trade
distortions  arising from import substitution strategies, may
eventually be even more  important to  growth  in world trade than
reforms  in  developed agricultural economies.
Finally, there  is  potential for  long, drawn out and exceedingly
complex negotiations over health and sanitary regulations.  Because of
their  complexity, and different national attitudes  toward health and
sanitation, this area has  the potential  to become a negotiating bog
(not unlike the PSE),  stalling real progress on other  issues.  Beyond
general agreements  to pursue more uniform regulatory standards and
improve notification and consultation procedures,  it will be
exceedingly difficult to  achieve major "H&S" accords  in this round,
although the groundwork for such accords could perhaps be  laid.
It must be remembered that the Uruguay Round involves  fourteen
other negotiating areas besides agriculture, and that important cross-
cutting deals will ultimately be made.  Nevertheless, this round  is
being regarded as  a make-or-break event, the results of which will
affect domestic agricultural policies  in much of the world.  For the
nations meeting in GATT, liberalizing agricultural trade will require
political courage and practical  diplomacy.  The failure to  do so will
result  in enormous  costs  to  importers, exporters, producers  and
consumers  in the North and South alike.- 19 -
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IUnited States, the European Community, Canada,  the Nordic
countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland),  Japan and the Cairns
Group.  This latter group consists of  13 agricultural exporters who
consider themselves  to  be "fair traders" not reliant on  export
subsidies:  Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay,
Brazil, Thailand, Hungary, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia and
the Philippines.Figure 1.
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